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Schejter: "Jacob's Voice, Esau's Hands": Transparency as a First Amendment

"JACOB'S VOICE, ESAU'S HANDS":
TRANSPARENCY AS A FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT IN AN AGE OF
DECEIT AND IMPERSONATION
Amit Schejter*
The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands ofEsau
-Genesis 27:23
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION

Changes in media technology often require a reevaluation of the
underlying assumptions that guide policymakers. A case in point is the
electronic media's move to digital technology. The literature that
describes this transition and its policy implications has focused on the

more efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum and the increased
interoperability between broadcasting, telecommunications and
computers,' on new applications, fragmentation of audiences,
globalization, the weakening of public service broadcasting, 2 and on
expanding user control amid increasing data collection.3 This Article
will illustrate the dangers looming in the manipulative capabilities of
these new technologies, their obstructive impact on free speech, and the
obstacles they pose to conducting truthful ethical discourse in society
* Ph.D., Rutgers. Assistant professor of communications, College of Communications, Penn
State University. The author wishes to thank Matt McAllister, John Christman, Krishna Jayakar,
Ming Kuok Lim, Murali Balaji, Moran Yemini and Judy Maltz for their invaluable contribution to
the manuscript at different stages of its development.
This study was supported by a Page Legacy Grant awarded by the Arthur W. Page Center for
Integrity in Public Communication at the College of Communication at Penn State University.
1. See, e.g., Hernan Galperin, Can the US Transition to Digital TV Be Fixed? Some Lessons
from Two European Union Cases, 26 TELECOMM. POL'Y 3, 3-4 (2002).
2. Jean K. Chalaby & Glen Segell, The Broadcasting Media in the Age of Risk: The Advent
of Digital Television, I NEW MEDIA & Soc'Y 351, 352-53 (1999).
3. Matt Carlson, Tapping into TiVo: Digital Video Recorders and the Transition from
Schedules to Surveillance in Television, 8 NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y 97,97-98 (2006).
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resulting in the rise of a new "culture of deceit." As a result, it will offer
a new First Amendment right-the right for transparency.
Indeed, technology alone cannot explain the motivations behind its
excessive manipulative use, motivations that are deeply rooted in the
rising culture of consumerism and the commercialization of the public
sphere; 4 however, technological change should be seen as a major
contributor to the pace in which the offspring of this culture are
emerging as these technological capabilities have the ability to disguise
content and insert it seamlessly into mediated products under false
pretense. This Article argues that while the immediate reaction to the
imminent takeover of this culture would be more control of speech, as
has already been advocated, 5 the solution lies in developing a new First
Amendment theory, a theory of separation that recognizes a First
Amendment right for transparency. The proliferation of a speech culture
rooted in dishonesty and deception is clearly a problem and a legal
solution is virtually unthinkable under current First Amendment
interpretation. From here arises the need for a new First Amendment
theory that aims to strike a balance between existing social First
Amendment justifications, such as discovering truth and enhancing
democracy, and individual justifications centered on decision-making
based on individual autonomy.6 This theory should be rooted in what
may have been seen in the past as the trivial expectation that speech
represents the true motivations of the speaker.
This Article will first present empirical data describing the
emergence of the new "culture of deceit." The description will be
followed by a theoretical analysis of its normative implications. The
theory proposed will import principles of fair competition developed in
antitrust law and regulation, and apply them to the First Amendment
concept of the "marketplace of ideas," attempting to bridge the gap
between the "economic" and "social" theories of the First Amendment
by providing social justifications for what antitrust law views as purely
4. See generally MATTHEW P. MCALLISTER, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICAN
CULTURE: NEW ADVERTISING, CONTROL AND DEMOCRACY (1996) (discussing the influence and
implications on society of the rise of advertising and mass media).
5. See, e.g., Jube Shiver Jr., FCC Asks for Help on Stealth TV Ads, L.A. TIMES, June 15,
2005, at C3; Anne Marie Squeo, FCC Issues Rebuke in PoliticalFlap over Video Spots, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 14, 2005, at B8; Sharon Waxman, Hollywood Unions Object to ProductPlacement on TV,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at C3; John Eggerton, FCC Issues Payola Fact Sheet, BROADCASTING
&

CABLE,

June

15,

2005,

http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA608608.html?

display=Breaking+News; Tessa Wegert, Product Placement in Peril?, CLICKZ, Oct. 16, 2003,
http://www.clickz.com/experts/media/media-buy/article.php/3091761.
6. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and'Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (2001).
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economic considerations.7 The first step taken in antitrust procedures
when attempting to assess whether or not a corporation has demonstrated
anticompetitive behavior is to define the "product market" in which it
operates.8 The theoretical analysis offered here proposes using the same
logic and applying it to "speech products." "Speech products," according
to this theory, would be classified according to the particular "speaker's"
loyalty, adopting Clifford Christians's 9 adaptation of Ralph Potter's l
theory of social ethics to media ethics. The assumption of this theory
being that each "speech product" presents itself to audiences as aligned
with one dominant loyalty, that these loyalties are not interchangeable,
and thus messages motivated by competing loyalties should not remain
so. Therefore, ethics and ethical discourse would become the criteria for
assessing whether or not freedom of expression has been abused.
Applying this theoretical approach to today's media, this Article argues,
would create a marketplace based on a "culture of transparency," which
requires the disclosure of loyalties and separation of distinctive forms of
speech, rather than on a "culture of deceit," which relies on muddled up,
concealed and contradicting loyalties that seems to be evolving. Thus,
transparency becomes both the right of the receiver and an obligation on
the sender.
All forms of speech would potentially enjoy equal constitutional
protection in this proposed regime, unlike the situation today, but
"mixed speech" products, namely those characterized by conflicting
loyalties, would need to resolve such conflicts before being assigned to
the "market" where they are to be consumed. Instead of generating more
regulation, applying this theory would uphold integrity in expression and
would help audiences make decisions based on autonomous choice as a
result of being better informed about the nature of speech products to
which they are exposed.

7. See JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A PRIMER 10-13

(4th ed. 2001).
8. Id.at3O-31.
9.

CLIFFORD G. CHRISTIANS ET AL., MEDIA ETHICS: CASES AND MORAL REASONING 3-1 1

(5th ed. 1998).
10. See Ralph B. Potter, Jr., The Logic of Moral Argument, in TOWARD A DISCIPLINE OF
SOCIAL ETHICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALTER GEORGE MUELDER 93 (Paul Deats, Jr. ed., 1972).
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Long an accepted practice in the movie 1 and radio industries, 12 the
introduction of product placement-a practice that embeds branded
goods seamlessly and without disclosure to audiences into popular
entertainment products, overriding entertainment and artistic
considerations, in order to encourage their consumption-can be dated
to the 1950s on United States television,' 3 although it only started
making significant inroads in the late 1980s.'4 Media reports estimate
that advertisers paid more than $300 million to producers and the six5
"big broadcast" networks during the 2003-2004 television season.'
During 2004, more than $438 million was reportedly paid for
placements on network television alone.' 6 In 2005, paid television
placements overall exceeded $940 million in the United States. 17 About
half of all senior marketing executives, according to a recent survey,
admit to having paid for a brand placement.' 8 Senior executives forecast
its use will only grow' 9 and some predict that in three to four years,
product placement will be evident in 75% of all primetime scripted
shows.20 The value of the total product placement industry (broadcasting
and film)-which was estimated to be growing at a rate of just over 16%

11. See Jay Newell et al., Product Placement 1896-1982: The Hidden History in Product
Placement, 50 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 575 (forthcoming 2007).
12. See Lawrence R. Samuel, Advertising Disguised as Entertainment, TELEVISION Q.,
Winter 2004, at 51, 52.
13. The first major deal involving product placement was the placement of cigarettes in the "I
Love Lucy" show. See Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure
and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J. L. Sd. & TECH. 1, 70
(2004).
14. See Julia Michaels, Will We Be Seeing J.R. Plugging Goods on 'Dallas'Soon? Success of
Brazilian Network Is Spurred by Prevalence of Ads in TV Programs,WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1989, at
B4.
15. Michael McCarthy, Also Starring (Your Product Name Here), USA TODAY, Aug. 12,
2004, at lB.
16. See Gail Schiller, ProductPlacements in TV,Films Soar, Study Finds, REUTERS, March
30, 2005, available at http://www.idtalent.com/branding/press.htm#l0; see generally PQ MEDIA,
PRODUCT PLACEMENT SPENDING IN MEDIA 2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2005), available at

http://www.pqmedia.com/ppsm2005-es.pdf [hereinafter PQ MEDIA, PRODUCT PLACEMENT].
17. PQ MEDIA, GLOBAL PRODUCT PLACEMENT FORECAST 2006: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 12
(2006), http://www.pqmedia.com/execsummary/GlobalProductPlacementForecast2006-Executive
Summary.pdf [hereinafter PQ MEDIA, GLOBAL PRODUCT 2006].
18. Gavin O'Malley, Survey: 48.9% of Marketing Execs Have Paidfor Placement in Content,
June 14, 2006, http://adage.com/print?articleid=109902.
19. NBC Chief Expects More Advertising Within TV Shows, Sept. 26, 2006,
http://www.tv.com/story/6474.html?&print - i.
20. John Consoli, Product Placement Put in the Game, MEDIAWEEK, July 26, 2004,
http://www.aef.com/industry/news/data/2004/3030/:pfi-printable?.
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a year in 2004 2 1-grew by 29.5% during 2005. 2 While broadcasting
accounted for the bulk of this activity for the first time in 2004, the
expenditure in broadcasting nearly doubled the expenditure in film in
2005.23 Much of this growth has been attributed to the growing
penetration of digital video recorders that allow viewers to skip
traditional advertising spots. 24 This, however, is only part of the
picture. 25 The impact of product placement in broadcasting goes far
beyond the actual growth figures. The product placement industry has
redefined broadcasting by creating a new genre of "branded
entertainment. 2 6 This new branch of the entertainment industry has
created new "professions," such as "brand integrators,', 27 "branded
entertainment research" firms, and "branded entertainment quality
measurement" firms whose objective is to create the perfect match
between entertainment products and commercial brands and test its
efficacy.2 8 New business ideas inspired by the growth in product
placements include companies that provide online marketplaces to
introduce marketers to venues where they can promote their products
through seamless integration into entertainment products. 29 The direct
relationship between marketers and program producers has even affected
the basic business model of the television industry by introducing
"barters" as a means of compensation, 30 or by cutting television

21.
22.

PQ MEDIA, PRODUCT PLACEMENT, supra note 16, at 7.
PQ MEDIA, GLOBAL PRODUCT 2006,supranote 17, at 13.

23. Id. at 11.
24. This rationale is seen in the general media as well as in trade journals. See, e.g., Daren
Fonda, Prime-Time Peddling, TIME, May 30, 2005, at 50; Matthew Gilbert, Catching Unsuspecting
Viewers in a Time Warp Networks Manipulate Schedules of Show as to Control Channel Switching,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 2004, at N6; Will Shanley, Ad Trend: Sponsors Buy into Reality TV,
Companies Are Spending Big Bucks for Product Placements to Counter Digital Recorders and
Changing Viewing PatternsBut Risk an Audience Backlash, DENVER POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at KI.
25. It is important to note though, that prior to the development of digital video recorders, the
media industry had recognized that audiences were "skipping" ads. Indeed, the rise of the digital
video recorder only made the practice more pronounced. See ROBIN ANDERSEN, CONSUMER
CULTURE AND TV PROGRAMMING 20 (1995).

26. Evelyn Nussenbaum, Products Slide Into More TV Shows, With Help from New
Middlemen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2004, at Cl.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., PQ Media, iTVX Team Up for First Global Branded Entertainment Report,
Sept. 27, 2005, http://www.itvx.com/news/pq%20media.htm.
29. Gary Gentile, Product-PlacementMarketplace Launches: NextMedium Launches Embed
Online Marketplace to Organize Buying, Selling of Product Placements, May 17, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id= 1974290.
30. See, e.g., Michael McCarthy, HBO Shows Use Real Brands, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2002, at
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networks out of the business transaction altogether. 3' Not surprisingly,
several websites are dedicated to this blossoming industry,32 one of
which presents an annual award for the best product placements.3 3.
Not only has the digital revolution sparked the proliferation of
broadcast product placements, it has also enabled them to be displayed
in more innovative ways. The ability to digitally impose visual data over
video for example, has led to the digital placement of products in scenes
of scripted television programs, such as in the case of boxes of "Club
Crackers," "Cheez-It"s, "StarKist" Tuna, and "Nutri-Grain" bars
virtually placed on the set of programs such as Yes, Dear and Listen Up,
although they were not physically on the set when the shows were
taped. 4 This practice, which has emerged from the digital imposition of
billboards in sporting events, has been described in the following way by
a leading producer of this technology:
[V]irtual ads are inserted to the pitch in a form of 2D or 3D graphics,
animations and videos. The inserted.virtual ad remains tied to its exact
position on the pitch regardless of the camera movement, and thus
creates35the illusion that the advertisements are an integral part of the
event.
Digital enhancement has already spread beyond broadcasting. The New
York Times has reported that it uses "shadow ads," a technique that
embeds a "watermark" depicting commercial logos on pages that carry
news, and in particular on pages that carry stock price quotations, where
embedded logos of investment brokers are displayed.3 6
All this has given rise to a communications revolution of sorts. The
legitimacy attributed to creating illusion on screen and in print and, in
effect, providing viewers with a false impression of the "real"
dimensions of live pictures and the real motivations behind the
"creative" decisions of producers of television programs and designers
31. See, e.g., Brian Steinberg, A New Wave of 'Advertising' Pays Producer, Not Network,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at B1.
32. See, e.g., iTVX, Global Product Placement Trends 2007, http://www.itvx.com/ (last
visited July 29, 2007); Product Placement News, http://www.productplacement.biz (last visited July
29, 2007).
33. See BrandChannel.com, Brandcameo Awards, http://www.brandchannel.com/features_
effect.asp?faid=355 (last visited July 29, 2007).
34. Sam Lubell, Advertising's Twilight Zone: That Signpost up Ahead May Be a Virtual
Product,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at CI.

35. ORAD, Virtual Advertisement, http://www.orad.tv/page.asp?pagenum=101 (last visited
July 29, 2007).
36. Byron Calame, Cracks in the Wall Between Advertising and News, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2005, § 4, at 12.
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of news pages, has opened the door to an endless innovative stream of
deceptions both on and off media. NBC, for example, did not interrupt a
live broadcast of the 2005 Thanksgiving Day parade after two women
were injured in an accident involving an M&M balloon that was forced
out of the parade. 37 Instead, the network weaved into the live broadcast
previously recorded footage of the balloon crossing the parade's finish
line the year before and did not report the injuries to the live audience.3 8
Today, technology is used not only to manipulate live news for
commercial purposes, but also for political purposes. In May 2006,
prompted by a study conducted by the Center for Media and Democracy
39 a public interest group, the Federal Communications
("CMD"),
Commission ("FCC") launched an investigation into the use of Video
News Releases ("VNR") provided by commercial and political
stakeholders in news programs without proper disclosure to viewers.40
While the CMD study focuses mostly on VNRs produced by corporate
public relations finns, 41 the government also uses these prepackaged
news segments. 42 One such government-created VNR, provided by the
State Department to news organizations in 2003, depicted an IraqiAmerican thanking President George W. Bush upon hearing the news of
the fall of Baghdad.4 3 The State Department is only one among twenty
federal agencies that has made and produced such VNRs.4 4 Just as the
proliferation of product placement led to the establishment of a whole
new line of professional ventures and "professions," so has the VNR
business generated a whole new industry that specializes in their
production and reaps rewards for their effective undisclosed insertion
into television news. 45 According to one top executive in this industry,
37. Andy Newman, While Others Reported Accident, NBC Stuck to Sunny Rebroadcast of
Last Year's M&M's, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at B2.
38. Id.
39. DIANE FARSETTA & DANIEL PRICE, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, FAKE TV
NEWS: WIDESPREAD AND UNDISCLOSED (2006), http://www.prwatch.org/pdfs/FakeTVNewsApr2006Rpt.pdf [hereinafter FAKE TV NEWS].

40. Andrew Buncombe, American TV Stations in 'Fake News' Inquiry, INDEPENDENT
(London), May 29, 2006, at 19.
41. FAKETVNEWS,supra note 39, at 7.
42. David Barstow & Robin Stein, Under Bush, a New Age of Prepackaged News, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 1.
43. Id.; Buncombe, supra note 40.
44. Barstow & Stein, supra note 42; Buncombe, supra note 40; FAKE TV NEWS, supra note
39, at 10.
45. See, e.g., DS Simon Productions Inc., Video News Releases, http://www.dssimon.com/
vnr.php (last visited July 29, 2007). Several such awards went to a public relations VNR promoting
the arrival in the United States of a new book in the popular Harry Potter series. DS Simon
U.S.,
in
the
Potter
Arrives
for
Harry
Inc.,
Awards
Productions
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less than five percent of VNRs are identified as such by the stations
airing them.46 In August 2006, the FCC approached seventy-seven
television stations inquiring about their use of VNRs, 4 7 among them
49
48
stations in Boston and Baton Rouge.
Undisclosed sponsorship by both commercial and political entities
is not limited exclusively to digitally disguised fare. Local television
stations increasingly approach branded entertainment agencies and offer
to integrate their clients' products into news programs in exchange for
monetary compensation. 50 At least two television stations in
Washington, D.C. were found to be providing favorable news coverage
of corporations that in return sponsored the stations' charitable
campaigns, among them food and toy drives.5 1 The Education
Department was caught paying a columnist to promote the "No Child
Left Behind" law,52 part of $1.6 billion spent by seven federal
departments on public relations, advertising, and media from 20032005. 53 Indeed, providing journalists and others with financial incentives
is also a practice employed in the corporate world. 4 Corporations often
pay "experts" to appear on television shows as objective analysts and
promote their products while not revealing their ties. 55 This apparently
common undertaking has evolved into a new experimental type of
television show dubbed the "advertainment," in which guests pay to be
http://www.dssimon.com/Awards/Harry-PotterPop-up.html (last visited July 29, 2007). It was
aired, undisclosed, 1168 times over 368 stations to a total unsuspecting audience of nearly 68
million viewers. Marketing Kit, DS Simon Productions Inc., The Basics About DS Simon,
http://solis2.365media.com/UploadedFiles/Pl59/D88l/marketing-kit_2006-B38BF4BO-FOD647D0-9EDE-77571085A519.pdf (last visited July 29, 2007).
46. On the Media: The Nightly News Sell (radio broadcast Oct. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/transcripts 102403_news.html.
47. See Todd Shields, Feds Probe "Fake News "at 77 Stations, MEDIAWEEK, Aug. 14, 2006,
http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/news/networktv/articledisplay.jsp?vnu-contentid=l 002986110.
48. See Donna Goodison, FCC Queries WHDH, Other Stations, On 'Fake News' Story,
BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 16, 2006, at 35.
49. See BR Station Among 77 Queried About Video News Releases, ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Aug. 16, 2006, at C3.
50. Gail Schiller, In Risky Move, Newscasts Adopt Product Placements, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, Mar. 16, 2006, available at http://www.freepress.net/news/14432.
51. Paul Farhi, FCC Commissioner: TV Charity Drives Could Mean Payola, WASH. POST,
Dec. 23, 2005, at C1.
52. Christopher Cooper & Brian Steinberg, Bush Draws Fire over Fee Paid to Columnist to
Promote Policy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2005, at B3.
53. Christopher Lee, Update: PrepackagedNews, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at AI3.
54. See, e.g., Eamon Javers, A Columnist Backed by Monsato, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Jan.
13, 2006, www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2006/nf20060113_285 1_db035.htm.
55. Howard Kurtz, Firms Paid TV's Tech Gurus to Promote Their Products, WASH. POST,
Apr. 20, 2005, at Cl; James Bandler, Advice for Sale: How Companies Pay TV Expertsfor On-Air
Product Mentions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2005, at Al.
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interviewed. 56 While paid "experts" are disguised as objective
commentators, commercial interests, and in particular brand-promotion
motivated interests, have been deeply involved in creating scripted
television programs. 57 This trend began on "reality shows," a prominent
example being ABC's Extreme Makeover: Home Edition, where Sears,
Roebuck & Co. showcases its branded products as the props.58 It later
took the form of direct involvement in scripted prime time shows in
which characters mention, use and display products,59 where the scripts
are being designed to introduce products (rather than the products
serving as mere props that support the script),6 ° with extreme examples
being episodes that center around the production of an advertisement
that is then aired during the commercial break in the scripted program.61
In what can only be explained as a natural outgrowth of the ongoing onscreen mix of commercial, political, news and entertainment content, a
fall 2005 episode of The West Wing, a program broadcast on NBC,
included a televised debate between actors who were portraying
fictitious politicians. 62 During this "debate," to create the impression that
these were real politicians, the "NBC Live" logo was imprinted on the
screen just as it is during live broadcasts of news events. 63 The practice
of concealed promotion in media products has become so mainstream
that a Beverly Hills boutique sued a gossip magazine for ignoring it
while covering the buying habits of the rich and famous.64
The above-described "culture of deceit" that serves both
commercial and political interests has spilled over beyond the electronic
and print news media as well as beyond the United States. Product
placements and branded forms of entertainment can now be spotted on
56.
RADIO,

Marisa Helms, Launch of Advertainment Assailed by Twin Cities Critics, MINN. PUB.

2005,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/12/1413,
Dec.
helmsmadvertainment/.
57. See, e.g., Stuart Elliot, On ABC, Sears Pays to Be Star of New Series, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 3,
2003, at CI.
58. Id.
59. Lome Manly, When the Ad Turns into the Story Line: On Television, Brands Go from
Props to Stars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 3, at 1.

60. Gary Levin, The Newest Characterson TV Shows: Product Plugs, USA TODAY, Sept. 20,
2006, at IA.
61. Theresa Howard, Product Placement in TV Shows Moves out of Background, USA
TODAY, Oct. 15, 2004, at 3B.

62. Lisa De Moraes, 'West Wing' Candidates to Face Off in Live Debate, WASH. POST, Oct.
15, 2005, at COI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/
2005/10/14/AR2005101401982.html.
63. Id.
64. Beverly Hills Boutique Sues Us Weekly, MSNBC.cOM, Sept. 13, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14807020/.
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school buses, 65 in schools, 66 in books, 67 in college textbooks, 68 in
comics, 69 in video games, 7° on tables, fruit, urinals, turnstiles,
supermarket floors, basketball backboards,7 I and in Broadway shows.7 2
In a circumvented way, however, the "excess success" of this practice of
disguising content has caused the original technology that created this
imbalance to become part of the ploy itself. TiVO, the leading brand
among digital video recorders, 73 is now devising ways to expose
consumers who skip ads to ads more targeted to their interests,74 while
tracking their patterns of purchasing products.75
At first glance, all these developments may seem coincidental.
Higher digital video recorder penetration rate and the ability of
audiences to skip advertising that lead to the proliferation of "product
placement" in advertising-based television; the development of digitally
created "product placements" that update old films and television
programs with contemporary products; the positioning of digitally
created commercial logos during sports broadcasts, which create the
illusion of bi- or tri-dimensional fixtures in the stadium; and the
production of commercial or governmental VNRs with the "look and
feel" of professionally produced news segments as well as stories aimed
at the printed press, that integrate seamlessly into news programs and
newspapers in the United States and overseas.
This Article argues, however, that indeed there is a link, one that
threatens to undermine the freedom of speech that is so fundamental to
65. Caroline E. Meyer, The Next Niche. School Bus Ads: Mass. Firm's Radio Program
PromisesSales with Safer Ride, WASH. POST, June 4, 2006, at Ft.
66. Meredith Deliso, Consumer Groups Lobby to Remove Ads from Schools, ADVERTISING
AGE, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.commercialalert.org/news/archive/2006/09/consumer-groupslobby-to-remove-ads-from-schools.
67. Gregory M. Lamb, Product PlacementPushes into Print, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
29, 2005, at 12.
68. Justin Pope, Textbooks Are Free, But They Carry Ads, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at C2.
69. Kortney Stringer, Comic Books Draw in Ads: Product Placement Expands to New
Territory, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 19, 2006.

70. Jo Twist, Ads in Video Games Set to Rise, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/3727044.stm (last visited July 29, 2007).
71.

Jeff Gammage, Businesses Find New Places to Put Their Brands On, MERCURY NEWS

(San Jose), July 16, 2006.
72. See Lamb, supra note 67.
73. Press Release, TiVo, Inc., TiVo Launches Audience Research and Measurement (ARM)
Division (July 26, 2006), http://www.tivo.com/cms-static/press-99.html; Carlson, supra note 3, at
98, 102.
74. Kara Kridler, If You Have Power to Skip TV Ads, Will You Seek Them Out?, DAILY
RECORD (Bait., Md.), Dec. 2, 2005; see also Carlson, supra note 3, at 106, 110-11.
75. Katy Bachman, TiVo to Track Consumer Behavior, MEDIAWEEK, Sept. 20, 2006,
http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/news/recent-display.jsp?vnu-content-id= 1003154177.
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our political and social system. Therefore, it needs to be addressed. But,
while the knee-jerk reaction to this threat would be more stringent
regulation, as has already been advocated,76 the contention here is that
the solution lies in developing a new First Amendment theory, one of
separation for the sake of invoking the right for transparency.
III.

THEORIES OF SEPARATION

Media law scholar Jerome Barron recognized the "banality" of the
marketplace metaphor used to justify media regulation and called for its
"burial," while advocating a new First Amendment right, the right of
access. 7 7 The transition of the electronic media to digital technology, and
in particular the rise of the new "culture of deceit," may provide
justification for a revival of the "marketplace" metaphor by .bridging
between what Philip M. Napoli identified as its "economic" roots and its
"democratic" roots, 78 in order to create another right for audiences-the
right to transparency. The right to transparency, this Article contends,
can only be achieved through separation between discrete "media
products." The "marketplace" metaphor may serve this new right well, if
reformulated to adopt rules of fairness and disclosure derived from its
"democratic" goal, which transcend its "banal" economic interpretation.
A. Bridging the "Economic" and "Democratic"Roots of the
"MarketplaceMetaphor"
Napoli creates a useful dichotomy between "economic" and
79
"democratic" interpretations to the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor.
The "democratic" understanding of the metaphor is crystallized in the
idea that a free exchange of ideas is linked directly with the attainment
of political truth, and with the effective functioning of democracy. 0 The
use of the "marketplace" as the descriptor of the forum for idea
exchange, however, led to the development of a more concrete
identicalness between the marketplace of ideas and all other
marketplaces. 8 Bruce M. Owen simply stated he takes the market notion
76. See supra note 5.
77. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1647-50 (1967).
78. Philip M. Napoli, The Marketplace of Ideas Metaphor in Communications Regulation, J.
COMM., Autumn 1999, at 151, 152-57.

79. See id.
80. Id. at 153-54.
81. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 384, 389 (1974).
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"literally," 2 and the FCC adopted this concept as a policy and ruled,83
with the Supreme Court's consent,
that consistent with the
Communications Act and the First Amendment, the marketplace should
be left alone to determine the program format of broadcast stations. 85 In
fact, the understanding that the marketplace of ideas is and should be
treated like any other product market was the ideological force driving
86

the FCC in the

1980s.

However, approaching the media as a business, and therefore,
assuming market forces will ensure that all "needs" are met, is wrong,
argues Jay Blumler, citing the impact of new technologies on social
processes as an issue to be considered when designing policy. 87 Indeed,
this view is echoed by Robert M. Entman and Steven S. Wildman, who
find that promoting economic efficiency and social values at the same
time under the umbrella of the metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas,"
results in bad policy and bad policy analysis.88 At minimum, they say, a
new metaphor is required whose contradictions are less apparent.89
These critiques of the "marketplace" metaphor come with growing
acceptance of the idea that justice and fairness play a role in economics,
both with regard to evenhandedness in the distribution of wealth and to
neutrality in the procedures leading to the distributive decision. 90 The
conclusion being that if the "marketplace of ideas" was governed as any
marketplace, it would be only natural for it to adopt rules that maintain
fairness. In fact, introducing rules of fairness to this marketplace may
help bridge the "democratic" and "economic" interpretations of the
metaphor, and democratic decision-making would naturally result. In
short, using the "marketplace" metaphor, even in the economic sense,
82. BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1975).
83. Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 863-65
(1976).
84. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1981) (upholding the FCC's Policy
Statement).
85. Id. at 603-04.
86. See Napoli, supra note 78, at 155 (discussing the early 1980s FCC Chairman's approach
to communications regulations).
87. JAY G. BLUMLER, THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NEW TELEVISION MARKETPLACE
29-31 (1989).
88. Robert M. Entman & Steven S. Wildman, Reconciling Economic and Non-Economic
Perspectives on Media Policy: Transcending the "Marketplace of ldeas ", J. COMM., Winter 1992,
at 5, 6.
89. Id. at 17.
90. See generally James Konow, Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of
Justice Theories, 41 J.ECON. LITERATURE 1188 (2003) (analyzing various economic theories in
reference to differing preferences forjustice and fairness).
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would not spell chaos, since chaos is not the optimal prescription for a
functioning marketplace. A key tool for ensuring the market is
functioning both fairly and efficiently would be adopting the guiding
principles of the branch of law developed to deal with just this matter,
namely antitrust law.
B.

Operatinga FairMarketplace

The first step to assuring that a market is operating fairly under
antitrust law is to define the boundaries of the relevant product market. 91
To do so, the unique attributes of the product must be identified. In the
economic framework that guides this process, what must be assessed is
the ability of a manufacturer of a product to raise its price without losing
market share to a competing product.92 The relevant product market is
the smallest group of products that satisfies this test,93 which in essence
is a test of "reasonable interchangeability. 9 4 Can one product take the
place of the other in the eyes of a potential consumer barred from
acquiring the initial product due to its high price? This analysis, and
antitrust regulations in general, are designed to ensure fair competition,
on the one hand, but minimal government intervention, on the other, the
assumption being that once domination is avoided in narrowly defined
product markets they will proceed to behave "normally," since
competitive markets allocate production most efficiently,9 5 and the
"transfer of wealth from96 buyers to sellers or a misallocation of
resources" will be avoided.
Normal markets, however, have been seen traditionally as
motivated by profit and profit alone. In the words of Adam Smith, "[i]t
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest., 97 The
market's definition of reward, claims Michael Walzer, simply "can't be
right" because reward cannot hang on economic considerations or on the

91. SHENEFIELD &S TELZER, supra note 7, at 30.
92. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.11, at
6 (rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].

93.

Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. et al., Is Radio Advertising a DistinctLocal Market? An Empirical

Analysis, 14 REV. INDUS. ORG. 239, 242 (1999).

94. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
95. William MacLeod, The Relevant Product Market After Brown Shoe: A Framework of
Analysis for Clayton andShermanAct Cases, 12 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 326 (1981).
96. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 92, § 0.1, at 2-3.
97. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 30 (Electric Book Co. 2001) (1776).
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state of the economy.98 Recent economic research has found, in fact, that
triggered by potential consumer99 and wage earner1 °° retribution, firms
may choose action that is not focused on immediate profit-seeking
alone. 10 1 Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt demonstrate that there are
circumstances where the fact that a market is populated by players they
define as "inequity averse"-people who resist inequitable outcomescreates incentives for selfish players operating in the same market to
contribute to the public good. 0 2 Much the same can be said of the goals
of antitrust regulation, which are not limited to promoting fairness in
each of the distinct product markets.' 03 In fact, the separation of goods to
distinct product markets also enhances the ability to control the power of
dominant players and prevent it from spilling into and affecting other
markets. 10 4 It allows for "power in one locus [to] be checked by power in
another"'1 5 and to encounter "the concern over undue political influence
that accompanies economic power."' 1 6 Thus, the goals of antitrust law
are not limited to the creation of a competitive market for. the sake of
reaching a competitive price structure alone, but also for the sake of
containing the power of emerging monopolies within the markets in
07
which they operate. 1
C. Adopting a Theory of Separation
The act of identifying the identity of "products" for the sake of
defining "markets" requires full transparency regarding the functionality
of the product. Separation of markets therefore is a natural evolution of
transparency. Separation of products in itself serves'two goals: It
generates fair competition among them, and it allows blocking
98.

MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 108

(1983).
99. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairnessas a Constrainton Profit Seeking: Entitlements in
the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 728 (1986).
100. See Carl M. Campbell III & Kunal S. Kamlani, The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence
from a Survey of Firms, 112 Q. J. ECON. 759, 761 (1997).
101. Id. at 759; Kahneman et al., supra note 99, at 728.
102. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,
114 Q. J. ECON. 817, 819 (1999).
103. See Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More HumanisticDisciplines: What Are
the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1218, 1221, 1223-24 (1977); see
also Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense ofAntitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 382-84
(1965) (pointing out the indirect benefits of antitrust regulation).
104. See Sullivan, supra note 103, at 1223-24.
105. Id. at 1223.
106. MacLeod, supra note 95, at 326.
107. See id. at 326-27.
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advantages achieved in one product market from distorting other product
markets. 10 8 The art of separating distinct "spheres" or "loci" is a liberal
idea.' 0 9 Separating church from state and church from university were
mechanisms created for the sake of maintaining independence in each of
these "spheres."" t0 The separation of power between the distinct
branches of government was created in order to ensure they do not
encroach on each other's territory in order to ensure their proper
functionality.' 11 It is also an idea that can sit well with Marxist analyses
of society, as the Marxist "vision of individual and collective selfdetermination requires ... the existence of a protected space" from the
power wealth may have bn the making of meaningful choices. 1 2 Such a
space "can only exist if wealth and power are walled in and limited."' 3
Separation is not only a condition for freedom of choice, but also a
condition for equality. 1 4 When success in one "sphere" cannot be
transferred to other "spheres," it is barred from contributing to the
Maintaining
distortion of relations of power in those other "spheres.
for
efficient
social
be
seen
as
a
requirement
boundaries can also
1
16
The safeguarding and development of "borders" across
planning.
social "spheres" is in itself a useful exercise, and as the historical record
suggests, in societies with fewer boundaries, the existing boundaries are
not guarded as successfully, allowing those in17 positions of power in
certain "spheres" to migrate to other "spheres."' '
Hence, separation among "spheres" for the sake of diluting power
creates a more just society. Separation, however, can be misused to serve
those pursuing the acquisition of power." 8 This happens when
segregationist ideologies, designed to exclude and weaken individuals
and groups by forbidding them access to empowering resources, are
adopted." 9 The most notable instance was the notorious ideology of the
108. See id. at 326; Sullivan, supranote 103, at 1223.
109. Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY 315, 315 (1984).
110. See id. at 315-16.
111.

See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1965).

112. Walzer, supra note 109, at 319.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 320.
115. Id. at 321.
116. Konow, supra note 90, at 1225.
117. Michael Walzer, Response, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, & EQUALITY 281, 288 (David Miller
& Michael Walzer eds., 1995).
118. See, e.g., Dmitri Melhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-based
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1147-50 (1998) (documenting the history of
racial segregation policies adopted in real estate).
119. See id.
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"separate but equal" doctrine that guided public policy in the United
States for most of the twentieth century and was only abandoned when
its oppressive nature could not be further disguised. 120 It can be said that
the harm caused by this form of separation is a result of the fact that
separation here has been achieved using force against the weak and
separated communities. Using force for the sake of separation can also
12 1
be harmful when trying to create a comprehensive egalitarian culture.
Maintaining social strata and unyielding boundaries can, instead of
blocking the import of distortions acquired in separate "spheres,"
maintain distortions that are the outcome of the existence of separate
"spheres."' 2 2 The removal of boundaries for the sake of creating a
unified culture is, therefore, useful, important and empowering, as long
as the "unifying culture" is not guided by an interpretation serving a
dominant group.' 2 3 Hence, certain basic rules must be maintained, as the
creation of a true egalitarian sphere for discourse requires full disclosure
of the motivations of those taking part in the discourse. This type of
egalitarian sphere has been defined elsewhere as the "public sphere,"' 124 a
locale in which public opinion is formed and to which access is granted
to all citizens, 125 that is distinct from the state 26 and is "governed neither
by the intimacy of the family, the authority of the state, nor the exchange
of the market,"' 127 which allows for the evolution of undistorted

120.. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
121. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia:
Evaluating the ConstitutionalityofK-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 450
(suggesting that separation in public schools via single-sex schools directly conflicts With the
egalitarian principles ofjustice).
122. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes
Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. 813, 843
(1993) ("Utilizing the cultural frame of reference of the dominant group can be threatening to the
involuntary minority's identity and security, as well as the group's solidarity. As a result,
involuntary minorities are less likely to interpret differences between them and dominant group
members as differences to overcome; rather, they are differences of identity to be maintained.").
123. Id. at 846.
124. Not to be mistaken with other uses of the term, such as its distinction from the "private
sphere," see Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contributionto the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy, SOCIAL TEXT, 1990, at 56, 56-57, and from "the public" when meaning
"individuals who assemble," see JORGEN HABERMAS, The Public Sphere, in JORGEN HABERMAS ON
SOCIETY AND POLITICS: A READER 231 (Steven Seidman ed., 1989).
125. See HABERMAS, supra note 124, at 236.
126. Fraser, supra note 124, at 57.
127. John Durham Peters, Distrust of Representation: Habermas on the Public Sphere, 15
MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC'Y 541, 542 (1993).
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communication among its participants. 128 This can be achieved only
through a dialogue that is devoid of forms of domination. A model for
the establishment of this type of dialogue was developed by the German
philosopher Jiirgen Habermas, who argued for the protection of the
"public sphere" from the influence of political power and money, 129 a
goal others have seen can be implemented by pointing out "how the
reliance on market success that structures the United States media
system cuts off the public deliberation that is needed in a democracy to
bring about the consent of the governed."'' 30 In order to reach rational
agreement in such a social setting, it makes sense to take Habermas's
theory of the "ideal speech situation" one step further. An ideal speech
situation is one in which any attempt to reach a consensus based on
undistorted communications is protected against constraints caused by
extraneous motives and loyalties brought to the table by the discussants,
motives that might otherwise be perceived as perfectly rational in their
own right, but have no place in the specific "public," "sphere," or
"locale" in which a distinctively defined communication is taking
place.

13 1

The social role of separation therefore facilitates the realization of
multiple goals: fairness, equality, and dilution of excess power.
Separation enables the creation of transparency that contributes to an
honest exchange of communications, and separation through concrete
and strict definitions allows for the development of undistorted
competition.132 Hence, separation is a mechanism that can be seen as the
basis of both the social goals of the "marketplace," the reaching of
decisions by individuals based on a transparent process of fact-finding
and deliberation, and the economic goals of the marketplace, basing it on
a truly honest competitive ground. Maintaining separate "spheres" not
only serves fairness within and between "spheres," as mentioned, but it
also serves the public by allowing, through transparency, 33
a
knowledgeable autonomous evaluation of their worth to the consumer.'

128. Margaret Canovan, A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Habermas and
Arendt, 11 POL. THEORY 105, 105 (1983).
129. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen & Heman Galperin, Discourse Ethics and the Regulation of
Media: The Case of the U.S. Newspaper, 24 J. COMM. INQUIRY 19, 23-24 (2000).
130. Id. at 23.
131. See Nigel Blake, Ideal Speech Conditions, Modern Discourse and Education, 29 J. PHIL.
EDUC. 355, 356-57 (1995).
132. Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and
Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1012 (2004).
133. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885,899 (2006).
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In other words, this "theory of transparency" not only strikes a balance
between "economic" and "democratic" First Amendment justifications,
it also balances both these "social" rationalizations and individual
justifications for the First Amendment centered on decision-making
based on individual autonomy. Indeed, the distinction among "products"
enhances personal autonomy, since the ability to make a rational choice
is concomitant with personal autonomy. 134 And separation is not
possible without a clear identification of the differences among the
separated entities; hence transparency through disclosure is the sine qua
non of effective separation.
D. Rejecting a Hierarchyof Forms of Speech
One mechanism used specifically in American jurisprudence to
dilute the power of corporate speech is to award commercial expression
a lower status than other forms of speech. The Supreme Court ruled
early on that the constitutional guards for free speech do not apply in the
United States to "purely commercial advertising.' 35 Some years later,
the Court refined its commercial speech doctrine, stating that truthful
commercial speech does enjoy constitutional safeguards, albeit limited
ones, and that its regulation is justified when promoting a substantial
government interest directly and not extensively. 36 Awarding
commercial speech a lesser level of protection has been justified by the
understanding that "commercial speech is not a manifestation of
individual freedom or choice"' 137 or to use our previous classification,
that it plays only a partial role in the democratic function (or
justification) of the "marketplace of ideas."'' 38 This is a dangerous
proposition, as it allows other forms of speech to be included under the
same limited category, a concern raised in the court's deliberations.' 39 At
the same time, when the commercial aspect of the speech is not its
dominant feature, the expression obtains a carte blanche, unless of
course it is a form of "unprotected speech" altogether, such as
obscenity. 140 This too, seems to be an unwarranted consequence, as there
134. Meir Dan-Cohen, Conceptions of Choice and Conceptions ofAutonomy, 102 ETHICS 221,
221 (1992).
135. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
136. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 566 (1980).
137. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REv. 1, 3 (1976).
138.

See id.

139. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring).
140. Cf id. at 561-63 (majority opinion) (noting that commercial speech is afforded less
protection than other forms of speech under the First Amendment).
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may be locations where commercial speech should not be present, for
example, locations designated as "public spheres." The relative level of
protection of speech from government regulation allows suppression of
speech, while the relative location of distinct speech products does not
allow suppression of speech itself, but only its appropriate
compartmentalization. Thus, for example, separation of forms of speech
is needed to protect art "from the new power that arises within civil
society itself, the power of wealth," but only in order to allow artistic
speech to compete with other forms of art on its merit and not through
41
its transformation as a result of the interference of corporate power.
The next challenge is to decide on an agreed-upon mechanism for
establishing the difference between "speech products" circulating in the
"marketplace of ideas" and to define the "mini-markets" of speech. For
this, we turn to the ethical analysis of speech.
IV.

THE CRITERION FOR SEPARATION: LOYALTY

In order to be able to distinguish between different types of speech
we must first discern what makes some forms of speech different from
others. The legal differentiation between forms of speech can only serve
here as an indicator, albeit a useful one. While some commentators
rightfully claim that First Amendment jurisprudence as it stands today is
so wide that "[w]hen everyone can speak, and everything can be said,
speech has ceased to be special,"'' 42 it still distinguishes between
protected speech, unprotected speech1 43 and speech that is deserving
only of a limited amount of protection. 144 While historically, the
141. Walzer,supra note 109, at 318, 323.
142. G. Edward White, The FirstAmendment Comes ofAge: The Emergence of Free Speech in
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299, 302 (1996).
143. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("[T]he right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.").
144. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 ("In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis
has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.").
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distinction between protected and unprotected speech has been the
distinction between speech that promotes public discourse and speech
that promotes private interests, that is no longer the case with the
introduction of limited First Amendment protection to commercial
speech and with the classification of different levels of libel.' 45 For our
purposes as well, differentiation along these lines would be insufficient,
especially since the aim is not to censor any of the emerging forms of
speech belonging to the "culture of deceit," but rather to eliminate the
potential for creation of deceitful products. Another mechanism for
defining this difference would be to identify what is "wrong" with these
forms of expression that has drawn our attention in the first place.
Why should viewers, for example, expect that if the M&M balloon
is forced out of the televised Thanksgiving Day parade, the live
broadcast would show that rather than last year's balloon crossing the
finish line? Why should viewers expect that if two actors portraying
politicians participate in a debate as part of a scripted drama that the
logo on the TV screen would be the one designated for entertainment
programs rather than that reserved for live news coverage? And why
should viewers be taken aback when sighting a box of a new brand of
crackers on the set of an old television show? Although nothing illegal
has been done in any of these cases, the simple answer is that viewers
should be able to perceive when things that should stay separate are
being mixed, whether it be advertising with news reporting,
entertainment with news or commercial interests with artistic decision
making. Having already established the need to distinguish between
these conflicting "spheres," the conflict lies in a very basic notion, the
notion of loyalty. Television viewers watching a parade expect to see a
live parade and to be notified of an accident that takes place while they
are watching what they perceive to be news. 146 They believe the
broadcaster is loyal to them and will put their interests ahead of any
other, when it comes to the truthfulness of the report. 147 Television
viewers confronting a "Live News" logo on the screen believe they are
watching a live newscast. 148 They trust the broadcaster to use a "live
145. For an explication of this argument, see generally White, supra note 142, at 357-60.
146.
147.

See Newman, supra note 37.
Cf Editorial, What Local TV Does Best, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, May 10, 1999, at 10

(explaining that local television stations are adept at informing viewers about crises and oftentimes
do so more effectively than other mediums).
148.

Cf C.A. Tuggle,

JOURNALISM REV.,

Wagging the Dog: Technology and Local TV News, COLUM.

Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 57 ("Indeed, there are times, viewers tell us, that live

reporting enhances coverage of the story, giving them insight and context they would not get from
another type of report. However, they also agree, overwhelmingly, that there are times when live
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news" logo only for the purpose of distinguishing live news from other
programming. 49 Consumers of scripted television programs are taught
to think that the set of the program is designed with artistic
considerations in mind and that when a program indicates it is a rerun of
an old show, it is indeed that and not a rewrite meant to promote current
advertising interests. 5 ° That is because the assumption is that even on
television, creative talent make the artistic decisions.' 5 1 When all these
assumptions prove false, that means the viewers have been betrayed.
Indeed, loyalty is one of the key considerations in ethical decisionmaking. Ethical reasoning is often subject to controversy. 52 But
identifying sources of disagreement regarding the desirable course of
action in policymaking can facilitate the process. 53 At least four
fundamental issues are subject to disagreement: the empirical reading of
the facts; the non-empirical, definitional, framing of the facts; the
traditional, systematic underlying value system by which moral
dilemmas are assessed; and the divergent definition of the basic loyalties
between the disagreeing sides. 54 This model for ethical decisionmaking, known as "The Potter Box," focuses on competing loyalties as
its decisive factor. 55 As such, "The Potter Box" has become a central
tool in the pedagogy of media ethics' 56 as well, and as is evident in the
cases presented thus far, it is a potentially useful instrument in helping
sort out the differences and the potential for substitutability among
"speech products" in the "marketplace of ideas." The assumption is that
each "speech product" that presents itself to audiences is aligned with
one dominant loyalty, and should not be tainted by messages motivated
by a competing loyalty. Ethics and ethical discourse should, therefore,
become the criteria for assessing whether "speech products" are
reports are meaningless. One viewer characterized this as a bait-and-switch tactic. He looks at the
screen thinking 'live' indicates important news. Yet, he is often disappointed to find no 'real news'
at all.").
149. See Fair & Accuracy in Reporting, View from America: Fake Ads Ruin Credibilityof CBS
News, MoscOw TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000, § 1881.
150. Cf MCALLISTER, supra note 4, at 110-11, 124 (noting examples of product placement
designed to please advertisers rather than for artistic reasons).
151.

See id.

152. Potter, supra note 10, at 107-08.
153. Id. at 108.
154. Id. at 108-09.
155. There are competing versions as to the source of this name. See Nick Backus & Claire
Ferraris, Theory Meets Practice: Using the Potter Box to Teach Business Communication Ethics,
2004
ASS'N
FOR
Bus.
COMM.
ANN.
CONVENTION
PROC.
222,
224.
http://www.businesscommunication.org/conventions/Proceedings/2004/PDFs/21ABC04.PDF.
156. See generally CHRISTIANS ET AL., supra note 9, at x-xi (suggesting the use of the Potter
Box as an analytical tool for all the cases in the text).
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distorting "speech markets" and whether they are strengthening the
dominance of certain types of speech obtained through the abuse of
"market power."
V.

UTILIZING PROFESSIONAL CODES OF ETHICS

One method for identifying what loyalties characterize which
products could be to examine ethical codes adopted by practitioners of
different professions engaged in creating media products. While such an
examination would require an entire study in itself, this Article would
not be complete without at least a sampling to prove the methodology's
utility. The issue of loyalty is central in ethical analyses and
international comparisons of journalists' ethics highlight interesting
cross-cultural differences. Journalists in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,
for example, have been found to be receptive to receiving "freebies"
from subjects whom they cover.157 Chinese journalists in particular find
themselves more often than not "compelled[] to submitting themselves
to two masters," be it corporate sponsors, advertisers or the government,
in addition to their newspaper.158 Some Islamic countries demand
religious loyalty of journalists in their ethical codes.6159
All of these
0
systems.'
media
Western
in
of
unheard
are
requirements
Just as dramatic, albeit somewhat more subtle, differences exist
among the various media professions. For example, the Global Protocol
on Public Relations, published by the Global Alliance for Public
Relations and Communication Management, states under the heading
"Loyalty," that "[w]e will insist that members are faithful to those they
represent, while honoring their obligations to serve the interests of
society and support the right of free expression.' 6' This hierarchy of
loyalties is reflected in the Public Relations Society of America's Code

157. Ven-hwei Lo et al., Ethical Attitudes and Perceived Practice: A Comparative Study of
Journalistsin China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 15 ASIAN J. COMM. 154, 158-59, 168 (2005).
158. Id. at 165.
159. See Kai Hafez, Journalism Ethics Revisited: A Comparison of Ethics Codes in Europe,
North Africa, the Middle East, and Muslim Asia, 19 POL. COMM. 225, 244 (2002).

160. Indeed, regarding the receiving of "freebies," studies have determined. that sports
journalists at some media outlets, on occasion, operate by norms not acceptable in other
departments of the newspaper. See Marie Hardin, Survey Finds Boosterism, Freebies Remain
Problemfor Newspaper Sports Departments,NEWSPAPER RES. J., Winter 2005, at 66, 66-67.

on

161. Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management, Global Protocol
Public Relations Protocol-Summer 2002, http://www.globalpr.org/knowledge/ethics/

protocol.asp (last visited July 29, 2007).
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of Ethics as well. 162 The American Association of National Advertisers
explains that "advertising and America are inextricably intertwined in
ways that positively impact the interests of consumers, businesses and
our nation as a whole."' 163 A similar hierarchy appears in the standards of
practice published by the American Association of Advertising Agencies
that hold that the first "responsibility of advertising agencies is to be a
constructive force in business" and that "advertising agencies must
' 64
recognize an obligation, not only to their clients, but to the public.'
On the other hand, Article I of the Statement of Principles of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors states that "[t]he primary
purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve the
general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to make
judgments on the issues of the time"; 65 the Society of Professional
Journalists' Code of Ethics states that "j]oumalists should be free of
obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know";' 6 6 the
Radio-Television News Directors Association & Foundation Code of
Ethics states that "[p]rofessional electronic journalists should recognize
that their first obligation is to the public"; 167 the Code of Ethics of the
Society of American Business Editors and Writers stipulates that "[a]
business, financial and economics writer should ....[r]ecognize the
trust, confidence and responsibility placed in him or her by the
publication's readers and do nothing to abuse this obligation";' 68 and
most notable and relevant to this study, the National Press Photographers
Association states in its Code of Ethics that "[p]hotojournalists operate
as trustees of the public,"'169 and incorporated into its bylaws in 1995 a
statement entitled "Digital Manipulation Code of Ethics," which
162. See Public Relations Society of America, Public Relations Society of America Member
Code of Ethics 2000, http://www.prsa.org/aboutUs/ethics/preamble-en.html (last visited July 29,
2007).

163.

Association of National Advertisers, Inc., The Role of Advertising in America (2007),

http://www.ana.net/govt/what/role of_advertising.cfm (last visited July 29, 2007).
164. American Association of Advertising Agencies, Standards of Practice of the American
Association of Advertising Agencies (Sept. 18, 1990), http://www.aaaa.org/EWEB/upload/

inside/standards.pdf.
165.

American Society of Newspaper Editors, ASNE Statement of Principles (Nov. 29, 2006),

http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm.
166. Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics (1996), http://www.spj.org/pdf/
ethicscode.pdf.
167. Radio-Television News Directors Association & Foundation, Code of Ethics and

Professional Conduct (Sept. 14, 2000), http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.html.
168.

American Society of Newspaper Editors, Code of Ethics: Society of American Business

Editors and Writers (Dec. 9, 2002), http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=4221.
169. National Press Photographers Association, NPPA Code of Ethics, http://www.nppa.org/
professional-developmentlbusiness~practices/ethics.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
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stipulates that since the guiding principle of the journalistic profession is
alter the content of a photograph in any way that
accuracy "it is wrong' 17to
0
deceives the public."

Clearly, journalists, public relations professionals, advertisers, and
advertising agencies all profess loyalty to the truth. However, as this
selection of statements by their representative professional associations
demonstrates, their loyalties are not ranked in the same order.
Consequently, they produce "different" products, which are not
interchangeable. Indeed, their uniqueness stems from the fact that their
creators have distinct loyalties. More important, however, is the fact that
by maintaining their distinction, their consumers-the general publicis better off.
VI.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The American legal system has dealt with the apparent impact of
commercial considerations on news and entertainment content by
regulating undisclosed commercial messages in broadcasting ever since
the Radio Act of 1927.171 The Communications Act of 1934 stipulates
that all matter broadcast by a broadcasting station for which any type of
monetary (or other) compensation is provided must be identified as
such.1 72 When a broadcast station airs any matter in return for
compensation, it must identify the sponsor at the time of the
broadcast. 73 These regulations have led many companies to supply
producers with products free of charge, under the assumption that in this
way they are bypassing the rule V4-an interpretation supported by the
language of FCC regulations. 175 Disclosure, while maintaining the
inclusion of commercially or politically motivated speech in creative or
news content, does not alleviate the problem as it has been defined here,

170. National Press Photographers Association, Digital Manipulation Code of Ethics,
http://nppa.org/professional-development/business-practices/digitalethics.html (last visited July 29,

2007).
171. Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting:
Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations, 192 7-1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 331,
333 (2004).
172. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000). Section 508 of the Act requires those providing and those

receiving compensation to notify the station. 47 U.S.C. § 508 (2000).
173. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2005).
174. Rosemary J. Avery & Rosellina Ferraro, Verisimilitude or Advertising? Brand
Appearances on Prime-Time Television, 34 J. CONSUMER AFF. 217, 218 (2000).
175. See Matthew Savare, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood and Vine: The Business,
Legal, and Creative Ramifications of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 331, 361 nn.20405 (2004).
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since it does not support the creation of "safe harbors" or "spheres" that
are not dominated by commercial and political interests. The need for
such independent "spheres" has been reflected in public opinion polls as
well. A recent survey found that while public broadcasting was the most
trusted source of news in America, advertising executives were the least
trusted.1 76 This does not imply that "news" and "art" are privileged
forms of speech, necessarily, only that they are different. Applying the
"culture of transparency" standard devised here requires a different
practical approach to overcome the "culture of deceit" than the one of
"disclose and forget." Under this new model, all forms of speech would
enjoy equal constitutional protection, unlike the situation today, so long
as they remain separate. But since "mixed speech" products, namely
those characterized by conflicting loyalties, would need to resolve such
conflicts before being assigned to the "market" where they are to be
consumed, the method of disclosure used today would be insufficient.
How would this distinction work in practice?
Potential conflicts between business and editorial interests that have
been identified have also been dealt with over time in various ways, such
as establishing barriers between the editorial and business operations of
media, in particular, newsrooms.1 77 These barriers, as noted, however,
are beginning to collapse. Live broadcasts delivered by "journalists"
succumb to commercial needs, and the newsroom itself is being used to
promote the attractiveness of entertainment products.178 An extreme
solution would be banning news on channels that carry entertainment
programs, banning advertising on news programs, or a clear transparent
division between the news production and the marketing teams, such
that will not allow the news production teams to make commercial
considerations of any kind in the process of producing the news. From a
practical point of view, this would require a structural separation
between the news division and the sales and entertainment divisions of
broadcasters (as opposed to the current internal bureaucratic divisions,
which are not transparent). Another solution would be identifying news
programs broadcast on commercial channels as such, the same way that
broadcasters identify the ratings of programs inappropriate for children
today, by imposing a logo on the screen. Consumers tuned into news
broadcasts on a commercial station and notified of its inherent bias to
176. John Eggerton, Survey Says: Noncom News Most Trusted, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6282871.html?display=Breaking+
News&referral=SUPP.
177.

For an array of examples, see CHRISTIANS ET AL., supra note 9, at 31-51.

178. See Buncombe, supra note 40.
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advertisers could then make their own choices. The difference between
this proposal and current disclosure requirements is that under this
model it is not the particular commercial relationship that is disclosed
(often at the end of a program in a manner that gains very little
attention), but the classification of the program that is announced. While
this is not the ideal way to attract more viewers, it must be said that
viewers who watch commercial news programs have been led to do so
through deceptive means, as it is not news they are watching, but
commercially motivated programs that use news as their editorial matter.
Indeed, banning commercial broadcasters from broadcasting news
programs may seem to be a harsh measure, but as research proves, given
the choice, local stations, in particular commercial stations owned by
networks, tend to minimize their news programming.1 79 Apparently the
production of news is not seen as central to their line of business.
The restraint and transformation of corporate power should not be
limited exclusively to news. If we wish artistic "products" to compete
with other artistic "products" on the basis of merit, there need to be
"spheres" in which they can operate regardless of commercial
considerations. Just as in the example of newsrooms, creative talent
should also have the opportunity to operate in a sphere that is not
dominated by commercial or political forces affecting and distorting
original artistic expression. Unlike the case of news, however, there is no
180
documented research indicating popular demand for such products.
The principles of such a differentiation should be drawn along similar
lines.
Beyond the imperfect example of public broadcasting, are there any
other working models of attempts at separation? One example is
Consumer Reports magazine. Consumer Reports provides an important
service when it grades and compares similar products. 18 Consumer
Reports is fully funded by its readers through subscriptions and
newsstand sales.' 82 Had Consumer Reports received any advertising
revenue, it would immediately lose its position among its readers as a
179.
Affairs

Michael Yan & Philip M. Napoli, Market Structure, Station Ownership, and Local Public
14-16 (Oct. 2004),
1, 11,
Television,
Local Broadcast
Programming on

http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2004/374/tprc2004_yan.pdf.
180. Indeed, the mere fact that there is no popular demand for such programming at present
does not mean this lack of demand in itself is not an outcome of the overpowering effect of
commercialism on media consumers. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY

67(2001).
181.
G4.
182.

See Michelle Slatalla, Turning the Table to Rate the Raters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at
Id.
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reliable source. How do we know this to be true? Because the faith
readers have in Consumer Reports emanates from the publication's
loyalty to these very readers who finance it. 183 Hence, even though

Consumer Reports provides totally commercial information, has no
political value and contributes close to nothing to democratic
deliberation, and even though it fuels a discourse that takes place in the
"market" and is motivated by marketing considerations, since its loyalty
to its readers is "bought," and does not stem out of a "higher" ethical
calling, its loyalty is its only asset, and is easily recognizable by its
readers. It is noteworthy that in the Consumer Reports example, very
84
little hinges on the actual level of research conducted by the journal.
Rather, it is its total loyalty to its readers (or more precisely, its
85
consumers) that generates the motivation for quality research as well.,
For the sake of the argument brought forth in this paper, however, this
element is only an added "virtue" of the proposed theoretical construct.
The Consumer Reports model also demonstrates that identified
loyalty, as the basis for a transparent communication, can evolve in a
self-regulated market. The dynamic at the base of this relationship is
stronger than any dynamic a regulated relationship would have achieved.
It is noteworthy that in the regulated environment, the motivation not to
86
deviate from the rules is created by the fear of institutional retribution.'
In this case, both the consumer and the publication put their trust in a
third party, the regulator, even though this party too has its own loyalties
and considerations, and its allegiance to its own ideological roots. This,
however, does not imply that all relationships can be self-regulated. In
fact, there appear to be very few that can.
Another example of a model that works comes from the realm of
television-the British experiment with "Channel Four" between 1982
and 1990. During this period, the channel was cross-subsidized by
183. See Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet Age:
Obstacles to Maximum Effectiveness and Policy Options, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 183, 203 (2000)
("[Buyers] also realize that informediaries generally serve the party that pays them.").
184. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at Cost": Legal Methods to
Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1065 (1990) (discussing the
unreliability of third-party services, like Consumer Reports, in relation to markup information about

automobiles).
185. See Slatalla, supra note 181.
186. See, e.g., Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental
Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 21 (2004) (discussing prosecution under the Environmental
Protection Act, the author argues that "as discretion blunts the law's expressive detail, it amplifies
its volume. The stated enforcement policies stridently command the regulated community to
collaborate closely with the government, police itself internally, stray from compliance at its peril
and, when it finds itself out of compliance, step forward and confess its sins").
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commercial television stations that sold its advertising slots.'87 Here
again, success was based on the idea of separation. Avoiding
competition over resources among the commercial independent
television stations ensured that Channel Four's decision-making was not
influenced by commercial considerations, even though advertising was
being sold on its programming. 88 This arrangement allowed for the
existence of a "public service" remit for programming financed by the
commercial sector, and a successful one at that.' 89 It is important to note,
however, that this goal was achieved not only through the financing
scheme, but also through extensive content regulation. 190
The practical implementation of the separation theory does not
necessarily mean restrictions on broadcasters, unless one would choose
to see the disclosure of "type of broadcast" as a form of restriction it is
not meant to be. In fact, it carries some "carrots." If indeed there is
agreement that commercial broadcasting is a sphere in which loyalties
lie with advertisers, there is no reason to restrict product placements in
this sphere whatsoever. In fact, it is not even necessary to disclose the
existence of product placement, as some might urge today,' 9' as long as
the program carries the identification of being a commercially motivated
program. Being part of the commercial sphere provides commercial
forces with complete freedom of commercial expression. This would
apply to VNRs as well. While they should be banned from news
programs broadcast on non-commercial channels, there is no reason to

187.

Georgina Born, Strategy, Positioningand Projection in Digital Television: Channel Four

and the Commercialization of Public Service Broadcasting in the UK, 25 MEDIA, CULTURE &
Soc'Y 773, 778 (2003).
188. See id.
189. Colin S. Sparks, The Future of Public Service Broadcasting in Britain, 12 CRITICAL
STUD. MASS COMM. 325,326-27 (1995).

190. Id. at 327. It should be noted that the "Channel Four" model is based within the British
system of broadcasting that is inherently different than the American system. The example brought
is not meant to imply that a similar model is possible in the United States, only that the principles
offered in this model can be applied in a system where commercial and non-commercial
broadcasting operate.
191. "Commercial Alert," a public interest advocate, filed, in September 2003, a petition for
declaratory ruling. A Commercial Alert, Complaint, Request for Investigation, and Petition for
Rulemaking to Establish Adequate Disclosure of Product Placement on Television,
(last
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf-pdf&id-document=6515285793
visited July 29, 2007). The petition argues that broadcasters and cable networks are violating section
317 of the Communication Act and provides documentation to prove that point. The FCC failed to
rule on the petition, and the FTC dismissed it arguing that "the existing statutory and regulatory
framework provides sufficient tools for challenging deceptive practices." Stuart Elliot, F.T.C.
Rejects Rule on Product Placement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at C5.
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prevent them from being broadcast on news shows aired on commercial
channels, as long as the news program is properly identified.
Each situation carries with it a set of rules relevant to the particular
context. Product placement on advertising-based television is acceptable,
whereas product placement on subscription-based (purportedly
advertising-free) television would be more questionable. The dilemma
here though arises from another context. While subscription based
channels belong to the "commercial sphere," there is a contractual
agreement between the channel and the consumer regarding advertising.
Advertising-free status achieved through an implicit or explicit
agreement needs to be enforced under contract law and is not to be
regulated or self-regulated through the proposed framework herein.1 92 A
somewhat similar logic underlies the analysis of the case of inserting
doctored news reports into newspapers and television as part of an
"information war" in a foreign territory. Indeed, such action might be
deemed acceptable in this analysis, as the context is war, a context that
does not lend itself to separation. While propaganda is not news and
should be kept out of all news programs, it is a weapon or tool of war,
and its use should be analyzed in the context of the rules of war. In this
case, it may or may not be found acceptable. This particular analysis,
however, cannot provide the tools to make that determination.
The creation of subscription-based commercial free zones,
however, raises social concerns as well, as it would seem only those that
can buy commercial free time will be able to enjoy it. That is a
legitimate concern. The existence of premium commercial free
"spheres" should not in anyway be seen as a means for absolving the
powers that be from allowing an opportunity for the entire population to
attend to commercial free "spheres." Indeed, the social equality
advocated by the theory of separation cannot come at the expense of the
existence of a publicly funded program that creates egalitarian
communication "spheres" accessible to all.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Instead of generating more regulation, applying this theory would
uphold integrity in expression and would enhance the ability of
audiences to make decisions based on autonomous choice. It would do
so by bridging between the economic and democratic goals of the
"marketplace of ideas" and applying market rules to this marketplace.
192. See, e.g., Andrea L. Johnson, Redefining Diversity in Telecommunications: Uniform
Regulatory Frameworkfor Mass Communications, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 87, 111 (1992).
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Perhaps the most apparent characteristic of the mechanism created to
ensure smooth market operation is the need to define "mini-markets" for
competition, since a market performs more efficiently if the
commodities are well specified.' 93 It seems only natural then that if the
same principles would be applied to the "marketplace of ideas," they
would improve its performance as well. The definition of the products
inadvertently allows for the second characteristic of a well-functioning
market to be present-the requirement that both buyers and sellers are
1 94
Since
fully informed about the characteristics of the products.
of
power
information contributes to the autonomous decision-making
the consumer, it can be said that the separation of the products
contributes to a "morally and politically necessary adaptation to the
complexities of modem life."'1 95
Indeed it is tempting to adopt an optimistic view of human nature
and regard some of the research findings that link fairness and market
behavior' 96 as a sign that the market will regulate itself. However, the
evidence, unfortunately, is to the contrary. As demonstrated herein, we
find ourselves drowning today in a cynical culture of deceit. Corporate
power needs to be restrained,1 97 market power and political power are
abused, and freedom of expression is the victim. A new line needs to be
drawn1 98 and its location cannot be redefined unless non-dominated
forms of discourse are used to achieve this goal. By using ethical
guidelines to draw boundaries of separation, the unethical aspects of this
culture are exposed. Eventually, this may bring about its demise.

193.

George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, HistoricallyContemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1,6

(1957).
194.

Id.

195.
196.
197.
198.

Walzer, supra note 109, at 319.
See supranotes 99-102 and accompanying text.
See Walzer, supra note 109, at 319.
See id. at 328.
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